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A

computer Network Attack (CNA) has been defined as operations to
disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers
and computer networks, or the computer networks themselves. 1 Whether
CNA operations are employed in offense or countered in defense, there are
complex issues ofproportionality, just as there are in conventional or kinetic attack situations. This chapter e:l>.-plores some of the proportionality judgments an
operational military commander must make. But first, it is useful to consider the
capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of the computers and computer net-,
works that are revolutionizing high-tech military forces.

Operational Proliferation
During the war in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, targets for NATO aircraft were
developed and reviewed by a computerized network that linked, in real time,
commanders, planners, intelligence officers, and data specialists on both sides of
the Atlantic. 2 Simultaneously, Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from surface
ships and submarines were planned and directed using computer programs. Inside an aircraft, tank, or the lifelines ofa warship, there are computer chips at the
heart ofevery weapons system. For example, to track Chinese M-9 missiles fired
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into the Taiwan Straits in 1996, USS BUNKER HILL (CG-S2) loaded a theater
ballistic missile surveillance and tracking program into the Aegis weapon sy£tem. 3 Computer watchstations acquire, process, display, and disseminate data
from sensors simultaneously. In air defense, the new Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) uses a network ofmicroprocessors and a data distribution system to share unfiltered radar measurements for composite tracking by dispersed
aircraft, ships, and ground batteries. 4 Electronic, acoustic, infrared, and optical
systems have many lines of computer code. Satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles, carrying sensors, communication, and data transfer links, are controlled by
computer programs. National satellite imagery, when netted, enables precise
geo-positioning for accurate targeting of standoff weapons, as well as mission
planning, battle assessment, and intelligence support. 5 Precision guided munitions depend on sophisticated computer programs for processing weapon engagement data, such as those embedded in the Low Altitude Navigation and
Infrared-for-Night (LANTIRN) and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar aSTARS) systems. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology is being
exploited so that redesigns and updates in military computers can keep pace with
the rapid commercial development in home and business computers.

Webbing and NeHing
The computing power in transistors mounted on microprocessors has increased dramatically for combat systems in individual aircraft, ships, and battlefield units. However, it is in the netting and webbing of computers associated with
command and control, surveillance, targeting, and gathering intelligence that is
adding a new dimension to warfare. 6 In a computer web, commanders at all levels can simultaneously view the same battlespace. The synergism of several networks, such as the Joint Planning Network, Joint Data Network, and Joint
Composite Tracking Network, enhance defense against ballistic and cruise missiles. In both offense and defense, decision-making is speeded up. Innovative
tactics and "self-synchronization" at the warrior level are facilitated. Coordination and rapid maneuver among widely dispersed units are enhanced. There is a
greater opportunity to get inside an adversary's observe, orient, decide, act
(OODA) loop. Secure video teleconferencing, data base connectivity, direct
downlink, and broadcast/receive capabilities provide access to intelligence, logistic, and essential support data, including weather, mapping, terrain, and
oceanographic predictions. 7 The correlation and fusion of data from sensors in
satellites, aircraft, ships, and battlefield units enable sensor-to-shooter connectivity and precision targeting. A soldier or Marine equipped ,vith a Situational
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Awareness Beacon with Reply (SABER) has access to thousands of friendly
force positions every hour, which gready minimizes fratricide in batde. 8 The
emerging global infrastructure of communication networks, computers, data
bases, and consumer electronics provides the National Command Authorities
and military commanders with new opportunities to gather intelligence and,
most importandy, to get indications and warning ofa crisis or threat ofattack.

Capabilities, Limitations, and Vulnerabilities
But with all the high-tech capabilities and potential, computers and their networks are only tools of warfare. Humans must make judgments, often based on
insufficient or ambiguous data. Identification and discrimination regarding military targets and civilian casualties are difficult issues and cannot be resolved entirely by computer networks. In Kosovo, for example, restrictions on minimum
altitudes and the types ofauthorized targets made it difficult for NATO forces to
destroy an enemy who had no requirement to shoot, move, or expose himsel£ 9
Then there is the reality that computer networks are not always available or fully
operable. Hard drives jam, memories fail, adapters burn out, cables sever, and
servers saturate. IO Difficult challenges of configuration control, standard computer language, reliability, and interoperability abound. ll The Office of Management and Budget places the number of Defense Department computer
systems at 8,145, of which 2,096 are deemed critical to military operations. 12
Furthermore, it is not easy to move "zeros" and "ones" where needed when
bandwidth is constrained. There is also the ever-present problem of recruiting
and retaining trained personnel to operate and maintain the sophisticated computer networks. In addition, data is not information. It is raw material that needs
to be processed to obtain ground truth and avoid saturation. Since all data when
displayed looks equally valid, computer-aided tools and filters are required to assign confidence levels to the accuracy of the information. 13
For high-tech military forces, the capabilities of computers and their networks far outweigh the limitations. But technical issues need to be vigorously
addressed. Systems must be designed with greater robustness, redundancy, and
the ability to degrade gracefully.14 Security systems (firewalls, shielding, intrusion detection devices, personnel checks, motion sensors, encryption, anti-virus
software, and training) are required. But firewalls and intrusion detection devices can be bypassed, and all software is inherendy flawed. IS It must be recognized that command and control, communications, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance systems have become much more vulnerable in information
warfare. 16 This is especially true in communication systems, which rely on a
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combination of military and civilian satellite networks and transponders. War
games, modeling and simulation, and actual incidents reveal a number of methods to attack computer networks. These include physical disruption ofhardware
and software, insertion of a virus, worm, or logic bomb into a computer program, flooding networks with false data, buffer overflows, malformed data, and
e-mail attachments, as well as unsophisticated jamming. 17 Intelligence gathering
satellites, military communication networks, sensor downlinks, and precision
targeting could be disrupted or defeated. But low-tech military forces, while less
dependent on computer networks, may, in some cases, be just as vulnerable to
CNA. Command and control may be a single path network without redundancy and fall-back alternatives. Satellite communications may be completely
unprotected. In addition to the vulnerabilities ofinformation systems, computer
network technology employed offensively has the potential ofproducing devastating effects on both military support (fuel, spare parts, transportation, mobilization, and medical supplies) and the civilian infrastructure (air traffic control,
electrical generation, water distribution, hospital life support, emergency services, currency control, and, ominously, nuclearreactor operations). Thus, both
high and low-tech military commanders and their national command authorities need to thoroughly analyze the legal and policy implications before resorting
to CNA operations, either in offense or defense. Then, there are the unfriendly
"hackers" and terrorist groups eager to exploit vulnerability asymmetries at
whatever risk and at relatively low cost. Cyberspace is a highly competitive environment world-wide. The long term effectiveness of computer networks may
be less about technology and more about the ability to organize and innovate.

CNA and Consequences
As indicated in the lead-off definition, a CNA can either be an attack on the
information resident in computers and computer networks or a direct attack on
the computers and their networks. Whether a CNA constitutes an "armed attack"18 depends not on the means and methods used, but on the resulting consequences. 19 The means and methods of attack may be similar to other offensive
information operations, such as psychological or electronic warfare, but the
consequences may be severe injury, suffering, death, or destruction ofproperty,
and amount to or rise to the level of an armed attack. On the other hand, the
consequences may be intrusive, annoying, or disruptive, but not an imminent
threat to life or limb, or intended to cause direct damage or injury. In both offense and defense, US military commanders are guided by the Standing Rules of
Engagement (SROE) for US military forces. The SROE bridge the transition
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between jus ad bellum and jus in bello by implementing the inherent right of
self-defense and providing guidance for the application of force to accomplish
the mission. 2o They are based on national policy, operational requirements, and
US domestic and intemationallaw, including the law ofarmed conflict. The elements of self-defense and mission accomplishment are necessity and proportionality, although the meanings in the self-defense context are much different
than when applied under the law ofarmed conflict for mission accomplishment.
The SROE make no distinction in the guidelines for self-defense and mission
accomplishment between an attack with conventional weapons and a computer
network attack. Thus, the same general criteria would apply, with supplemental
measures for a specific operation that might well include guidance on CNA
operations.

Self-Defense (Jus acl Bellum)
A military force on a post-Cold War mission (humanitarian, peacekeeping,
crisis control) could well be confronted with a computer network attack. The
attacker could be a malicious hacker, terrorist group, or foreign armed force.
Under the US SROE, necessity requires that the military commander must first
determine whether the CNA is in fact either a hostile act or a clear demonstration of hostile intent before he decides that it is necessary to respond. An armed
attack, such as sinking a ship, firing on troops, invading territory, blockading
ports, or mining harbors would in most circumstances be regarded as hostile acts.
A physical or kinetic attack against the computer networks that are vital for command and control, surveillance, targeting, or early warning could well preclude
or impede the mission and thus also be considered a hostile act. On the other
hand, a cyberspace intrusion into these same computer networks mayor may
not be a hostile act, although a disruption of the satellite network that provides
indications of an ICBM launch might, per se, be a hostile act since active defenses are not yet available, and in any event, cueing information is so crucial.
Although the CNA may not rise to the level ofa hostile act, the consequences
may demonstrate hostile intent, that is, placing the military force in imminent
danger. Hostile intent, however demonstrated, has always been a difficultjudgment call. The determination is both objective and subjective, influenced by
up-to-date intelligence on an adversary and his prior conduct. One military
writer has described the concept as an "expression of the national right ofanticipatory self-defense at the unit level. "21 Locking on an aircraft with fire control
radar, approaching on an attack profile, massing tanks and troops on the border,
or mobilizing the military and civilian infrastructure for war can all be evidence
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ofhostile intent. In cyberspace, there are a wide variety ofmethods ofattack previously mentioned that could adversely affect a military commander's computer
networks. However, the means of attack and the consequences may not be tangibly present-no "see and touch" evidence. Besides, since cyberspace attacks
are inherently anonymous, covert, seamlessly interconnected, and travel across
international boundaries via relay points, it is difficult to identify and trace the
source, and establish attribution. Is the perpetrator military or civilian, Statesponsored, a rogue organization, or an individual acting on his own? Absent a
conventional attack component, manipulation or intrusion by itselfdoes not automatically indicate hostile intent. A CNA intrusion into the communications
network could be just an intelligence probe for future operations. But a CNA to
disrupt the air defense and targeting networks could be the critical step before
launching an armed attack. There are many examples on both sides ofthe ledger,
and critical questions to ponder. Do the consequences ofa particular CNA place
the military force in inuninent danger? Is an adversary attempting to prepare the
battlefield for an armed attack that is likely, imminent, or unavoidable? Is this the
last opportunity for the military commander to counter the threat?22 If so, the
ingredients are there for hostile intent and the necessity to act.
In a CNA situation, just as in a conventional attack, the response to counter
the threat must be proportional, whether in anticipatory or actual self-defense.
That is, under the US SROE, "the force used must be reasonable in intensity,
duration, and magnitude, based on all the facts known to the commander at the
time, to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure the continued safety of US forces."23 In self-defense "proportionality points at a symmetry or approximation in 'scale and effects' between the unlawful force and the
lawful counter-force.... A comparison must be made between the quantum of
force and counter-force used, as well as the casualties and damage sustained. "24
A military commander must decide what weapons, means of delivery, countermeasures, and tactics are the most appropriate for the situation. For example, the
Doctrine for Joint Operations in operations other than war provides that "military force be applied prudently.... Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of
violence characterize the environment."25 The objective is to respond withjust
enough force to control the threat and protect the forces. The response need not
be in kind or executed on the spot, iftime permits due consideration. For example, in Operation EARNEST WILL (reflagging and protecting Kuwaiti tankers
during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War), after the USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS
(FFG-58) hit an Iranian-laid mine, the appropriate and proportional response
selected by the National Command Authorities was to attack Iranian oil platforms, attacking Iranian ships only if they fired on US ships.26 On the other
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hand, a theater ballistic missile fired at the military force or a facility under its
protection requires action within minutes to acquire, track, and engage the missile. Also guiding a military commander in responding to an attack, CNA or
conventional, will be a nation's policy objectives. US policy, as stated in the
SROE, is to maintain a stable international environment and provide an effective and credible deterrent to armed attack. If deterrence fails, in addition to being proportional, the response should be designed to limit the scope and
intensity of a conflict, discourage escalation, and achieve political and military
objectives. 27 Finally, the use offorce is normally the last resort. When time and
circumstances permit, the potentially hostile force should be warned and given
the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions. 28
During the Naval War College symposium, "Computer Network Attack and
International Law," the Proportionality Working Group discussed various approaches for developing a response to a CNA.29 One such framework would be
to analyze the attack in categories ofconsequences, such as a network attack with
only network effects, a network attack with network and conventional effects,
and a conventional attack with network and conventional effects. For each category evaluated, a military commander could consider various options for a proportional response: computer network only, both computer network and
conventional, or conventional only. In reaching a judgment, a military commander, guided by the SROE, might pose a series ofquestions to be resolved for
each option, matched against each category: Is there time for a warning to cease
threatening actions and an opportunity for the adversary to withdraw? Does the
CNA place the military force in imminent danger? Is the CNA the final stage in
preparing the battlefield for an attack? Is this the last opportunity for a military
commander to protect his force? Is the response contemplated reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude? Will the response effectively counter the
threat and remove his force from danger? Is a computer network response or a
conventional response the most appropriate, or a combination ofboth? Ifa computer network response, is there an ability to accurately assess the consequences?
Does a computer network response involve a cross-border intrusion? Will the
response assist in stabilizing the immediate crisis? Is the response designed to
limit the scope and intensity ofan impending conflict? Does it discourage escalation? Is the response consistent with maintaining a credible deterrent to further
CNAs? What will be the effects, intended or unintended, on civilians, their
property and infrastructure? Can these effects be distinguished from effects on
military personnel, equipment, and infrastructure?
In the case of a CNA ,vith only network effects, the consequences, although
degrading a particular computer network, may not place the force in imminent
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danger or be evidence of an impending attack. The appropriate response might
be to shift to an alternate network, use computer countermeasures to e).-pel the
intruder, sanitize the system, and report to higher authority. This situation
would be analogous to tolerating an aircraft tracking radar, but not a locked on
fire control radar. Higher authority, with the requisite technical e).-pertise and
network connections, could trace the intrusion, identify the perpetrator, and
take appropriate action, such as a complaint to the relay State, if the CNA appears to be State-sponsored. Or, if the intrusion is an intelligence probe, higher
authority might choose to play the game and "grab the hacker," feeding him
false information covertly. If, however, the network effects disable the air and
missile defense network and are judged as the overriding evidence of armed attack, the immediate response might be to launch a conventional attack against
the most threatening military targets-tanks and troops, aircraft on runways,
missile sites, command headquarters, and the like. Such a response would be
timely and might discourage an adversary from attacking or, at least, indicate that
there will be a high cost to proceeding. This would not rule out a follow-up
computer network response against, for example, the adversary's military command and control network, executed at the appropriate level by trained network
experts. In either situation ofa CNA with network effects only, the proportionality set-point to trigger a response in kind should be high since the intrusion
may be ambiguous and non-threatening or the response would not be timely,
effective, or within the capability of the operational commander to execute.
In a crisis situation, an adversary may choose to initiate a CNA that has both
network and conventional effects, such as manipulating the air traffic control
network ofan aircraft carrier that causes collisions or near misses ofaircraft in the
approach and landing pattern. This attack would be less risky than attacking the
carrier or its air wing. The overall effect is to raise the level of hostility and resolve some of the ambiguity in identifying the source. Obviously the situation
cannot be tolerated. If overall intelligence plus the conventional effects can presumptively attribute the CNA to a particular adversary, the initial response
might be a stem warning to cease the hazardous computer operations, in addition to shifting to an alternate control mode, attempting to e).-pel the perpetrator, and sanitizing the system. If, despite the warning and opportunity to cease,
the disruption continues, the military commander might respond with a conventional, precision attack against the most appropriate military target that
would reinforce the warning with force. Such targets might be a facility for the
production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, ballistic missile
launchers that are not yet mobile, or a new warship about to be launched. This
would be analogous to the response when the USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS
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hit the Iranian mine which was laid arbitrarily to hazard both warships and merchant ships. That response was neither in kind nor executed immediately. If the
computer specialists also have the capability to intrude and disrupt one ofthe adversary's vital military computer networks, this would also be an appropriate and
timely response. All ofthese responses are intended to control the crisis, discourage escalation, and avoid collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians.
In the case of a physical attack against a computer network asset itself, such as
destroying a satellite (communications, navigation, imagery) or damaging a
command and control (C2) node, the conventional effects are tangible and serious. The source and location can probably be pinpointed. Destruction ofa satellite \vithout other evidence of hostile intent would not warrant an immediate
physical or CNA response. But such an extraordinary act would have implications and effects world-wide, and would merit immediate attention at the highest levels of government, as well as the United Nations Security Council. If the
destruction of the satellite or damage to the C2 facility is the prelude to armed attack, a robust and direct conventional response to blunt the attack would probably be the most effective. All military targets that are part of or supporting the
attack would be fair game. The objective would be to protect the force, control
the threat, discourage escalation, and, at the same time, avoid collateral damage
and incidental injury to civilians. A parallel CNA response to degrade, manipulate, or destroy information resident in the adversary's C2 computer networks
might effectively complement the conventional response. This response might
target networks that support the armed attack, taking care to avoid unintended
network effects that injure or kill civilians or damage their property. Here, the
problem is sorting out the network effects that may be inextricably linked in the
military and civilian infrastructure.
There are numerous examples of network and/or conventional consequences and responses to a CNA that can be analyzed in the categories postulated. The most appropriate and proportional response will depend on a careful
consideration ofthe facts, context, and intelligence in each particular case, whatever method of determination is pursued.

Mission Accomplishment (Jus in Bello)
A military force involved in a crisis or action in self-defense that develops into
a low intensity conflict or prolonged war could be authorized to conduct CNA
operations, that is, attack the information resident in computers and computer
networks, or attack the computers and their networks direcdy. In applying force
to accomplish a mission, the SROE provides that US forces will be governed by

155

Computer Networks, Proportionality, and Military Operations
the law of anned conflict30 and rules of engagement. Also, as mentioned previously, the elements of mission accomplishment are necessity and proportionality. Hostile acts and intent are presumed. Necessity means that attacks must be
limited to military objectives,31 and that force has to be constrained to that required to accomplish the mission. 32 Proportionality in mission accomplishment,
however, unlike self-defense, is not a comparison and symmetry between the
quantum offorce and counterforce used. 33 The objective is to defeat the enemy
as rapidly as possible. Disproportionate force may be, and often is, required. But
in applying counterforce, the law ofanned conflict requires that a military commander observe the principle of distinction between combatants and noncombatants,34 precautions in attack,35 and the law oftargeting. 36 Although it is not
unlawful to cause incidental injury to civilians, or collateral damage to civilian
objects, incidental or collateral damage must not be excessive in the light of the
military advantage anticipated by the attack. 37 In applying this proportionality
balancing test, a military commander must take all reasonable precautions, based
on infonnation available at the time, to keep civilian casualties and damage consistent with mission accomplishment. He must also consider alternative methods
of attack to reduce civilian casualties and damage. In addition to jlls in bello proscriptions, a military commander will be guided by supplemental measures in the
ROE that "define the limits or grants ofauthority for the use offorce for mission
accomplishment. "38
The Proportionality Working Group 39also explored approaches for analyzing CNA offensive operations. For example, the CNA might be a network attack against a network target, a network attack against a non-network target, or a
conventional (kinetic) attack against a network target. These categories, while
overlapping and arbitrary, are intended to assist in focusing on the effects and
consequences of a CNA. For each option evaluated in terms of effects and consequences, a military commander, guided by the SROE and battle plan, might
pose a series ofquestions to be resolved: Will the CNA capture important enemy
intelligence? Does it assist in getting inside the enemy's OODA loop? Can the
CNA disrupt, control, or destroy the enemy's computer networks for intelligence collection and targeting? Will it contribute to establishing infonnation
dominance, air and maritime superiority, and space control? Does the CNA
provide the military commander with new options for favorably controlling the
rhythm of the battle? Will it influence the enemy to terminate military action
and alter policy? Does the CNA degrade an enemy's supporting infrastructure?
Is it essential in protecting own forces, equipment, and facilities? Overall, does
the CNA contribute to the partial or complete submission ofthe enemy \vith the
least expenditure of life, time, and resources? In coalition warfare, does it
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preserve unity ofeffort and consensus in waging war? Does the CNA respect the
inviolability ofneutrals and their commerce? Is the CNA consistent with United
Nations Security Council enforcement action, if any? Does the CNA involve
cross-border intrusions? Is it compatible with diplomatic and political efforts to
achieve a cease-fire, suspension of hostilities, armistice agreement, peace treaty,
or other termination of the war? What are the effects of the CNA on protected
persons (civilians; wounded, sick, and shipwrecked; medical personnel and
chaplains; and prisoners of war)? What incidental injury to civilians or collateral
damage is anticipated from the CNA, based on the best means to accurately assess the primary and secondary effects ofa CNA? Can the military effects be distinguished from the civilian effects? Is the incidental injury or collateral damage
likely to be excessive in the light of the military advantage anticipated? Will it
cause unnecessary suffering or be indiscriminate in nature? Are there alternative
means and methods ofattack that will reduce civilian casualties and damage from
that considered likely from the CNA? Will a decision to withhold network attacks
against network or non-network targets influence an enemy to also refrain from
similar network attacks, and can this restraint be relied upon? Finally, pertinent
to each of the questions, does the network or non-network target by its nature,
purpose, or use make an effective contribution to the enemy's military action,
and thus constitute a lawful military objective of the CNA.
In the category of a network attack against a network target, the intention is
to adversely affect the infomwtion resident in the enemy's computer network.
Examples include introducing information or disinformation (not perfidious)
into the computer network to influence or mislead behavior, intruding with a
data device or technique to degrade the military C2 network, disrupting vital
links in the integrated air defense (lAD) network, or manipulating the military
communication network to confuse the timing ofa maneuver or attack. In these
and similar offensive computer operations, the ultimate consequences are neither intended nor anticipated to involve incidental injury or collateral damage.
Psychologically, the civilian population may, as intended, be influenced, but the
effects would not be physical. A computer intrusion into the enemy's intelligence network to capture vital information, or indications and warning, would
be a necessary step in preparing the batdespace, and probably would not even fall
,vithin the definition ofa CNA. In any event, a network attack on the information in a computer network that is tailored to produce limited physical consequences may prove to be an effective non-lethal tool ofwarfare against military
objectives. An alternative conventional attack calculated to degrade the C2 and
lAD networks, for example, could result in civilian casualties and damage.
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However, in most cases, these effects would probably not be considered excessive in the light of the military advantage anticipated.
In the case of a network attack against a non-network target, the intention is to
damage or destroy military objectives through the medium of a CNA operating
on the information resident in the enemy's computer network. Examples would
include disrupting the military air traffic control system to induce collisions or
crashes, causing a military satellite to lose control and implode, disabling the electrical system in the enemy's C2 facility, and manipulating the computer network
that manages vital military support. For these and other military targets, and assuming an ability to accurately assess the primary and secondary effects, CNA operations may prove to be an effective method of prosecuting the war at less risk to
one's own forces. However, network attacks on the civilian infrastructure, even
though it supports the enemy's military effort, raises difficult issues. It may not be
possible to distinguish the military from the civilian effects because of the ineJ..-tncable linkage between the two. Even if that is possible, the CNA may set off a
chain of effects that cascades beyond the military and into civilian institutions. This
could raise questions ofwhether the CNA was indiscriminate and not directed at a
valid military objective. Furthermore, a cascading CNA might result in disastrous
consequences on essential services for the civilian population (electrical power,
water distribution, life support, nuclear power operations). Even assuming, for example, a CNA against an electrical power grid that supports the military effort, and
is therefore a valid military objective, there must be no indiscriminate cascading
effects, and under the proportionality and balancing test, any incidental injury and
collateral damage must not be excessive in view of the military advantage anticipated. The point is not to rule out CNAs in this category, but to urge caution in
their use in view of the uncertainty in predicting effects.
An attack against an enemy's computers and computer networks \vith missiles, bombs, or artillery shells is the traditional means of attack. A military commander must insure that the various computer network sites and facilities are
valid military targets and that incidental injury and collateral damage are kept to a
minimum. Damage or destruction ofC2 war rooms and command posts, for example, would contribute significantly to defeating the enemy. Air defense sites,
microwave stations, data relay facilities, and communication satellites can also be
electronically jammed from aircraft, ground stations, and warships. Damage or
destruction of a dual-use military and civilian satellite would raise serious issues
for high-tech military forces that are becoming extraordinarily dependent on
satellites for both military and commercial purposes. Should the commander refrain from attacking the satellite in the hope that the enemy will also exercise restraint? Is the dual-use satellite a valid military target when the band\vidth used
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by the military is relatively minor? Disruption, damage, or destruction of computer network facilities that provide essential civilian services, as well as support
the military effort, such as electrical power grids, may be unavoidable in prosecuting the war. But difficult proportionality judgments must be made even
though there may not be the unpredictable cascading effects produced by a
CNA. An assessment must be made that the civilian injury and damage will not
be excessive in the light of the military advantage anticipated. Temporarily disabling the power grids by attacking with carbon chaff, for example, may reduce
casualties and avoid more serious consequences, as well as influencing behavior.
Attacking computers and computer networks serving primarily the civilian infrastructure, such as banking systems, stock exchanges, water management, and
research centers, would be difficult to justify in terms ofa military advantage and
would probably result in excessive civilian injury and damage.
Just as in the jus ad bellum situation, there are many examples of actual or potential CNA offensive operations. While mission accomplishment proportionality takes on a different meaning from that in self-defense, the balancing test of
military advantage versus excessive incidental injury and collateral damage must
consider both the actual and cascading effects of a CNA, whatever method of
analysis is used.

Observations
CNA operations as part of information warfare or network-centric warfare
are in their infancy, with far-reaching implications for law, policy, and rules of
engagement. The ability to predict and assess the damage from executing a CNA
in offense or defense, similar to a precision strike weapon, is far from assured.
CNAs may well prove to be invaluable in defeating the enemy and countering
an attack, provided that trained and experienced computer network experts can
accurately "hit" the target, control the effects, and avoid unintended cascading
consequences. This assumes that CNA operations are authorized at the appropriate level. All this adds to the complexity ofproportionality judgments. However, the basic rules injus ad bellum and jus in bello still apply. An analysis of the
targeting must be conducted for a CNAjust as it is conducted for attacks using
conventional weapons. On the defense side, the old adage of the best defense is a
good offense may be turned on its head in the case ofCNA operations. There is
no question that a high-tech military force with significant network vulnerabilities must have a robust, passive protection against CNA. This requires increased
awareness, training, technical support, hardware and software improvements,
greater redundancy, and an ability to degrade gracefully in computer network
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equipment and systems. It also means that military commanders must plan and
train to "work-around" network attacks that disrupt, deny, or destroy critical
information resident in their computers and computer networks. This is particularly important since rogue and terrorist groups without asymmetrical vulnerabilities can wage network war on the cheap with little regard for the risk.
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